The reasons why small business development has been disappointing in Russia compared with other transition countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic are here analyzed. It is, however, suggested that the picture may not be so gloomy as official statistics suggest. As far as St. Petersburg is concerned, it has witnessed an exceptional -by Russian standards -growth in this sector in the 1990s, although it still trails compared with Moscow. This, despite the lack of support from the local administration and despite having an income per capita close to the Russian average. Again official data may be at fault through undervaluing the importance of the small business sector in the early 1990s.
Introduction
Small business in Russia has not fulfilled expectations, either in the late Soviet period or since the communist downfall. Legalized in the second half of the eighties when the Soviet Union was still in place to improve the availability of goods which were in short supply, it was initially expected to function within a system which was to remain largely planned. Instead, it might have exacerbated the scarcity of these goods and, by making the internal contradictions more evident, accelerated the fall of socialism. Similarly, the economic transition in Russia has been characterized by the limited development of small business which has been particularly disappointing when compared with the leading transition countries, especially Poland and the Czech Republic. Poland had 2,000,000 small firms in 1997
1 . The newly established private sector has been the main force behind the economic recovery and has led to a strong growth in the manufacturing sector in Poland (although growth has been slower than in services). By the late nineties, SMEs accounted for two-third of GDP and more than half of manufacturing output according to Gomulka 2 (Meth-Cohn, 1999) , Even in the Czech Republic, growth has been strongest in small industrial firms, while the contribution of large industrial enterprises has decreased (Borish and Noel, 1996) . The share of the former in total industrial production has increased from 3.8% in 1991 to 22.6% in 1997 (Bohata and Mladek, 1998) . The evidence from Hungary suggests that the industrial restructuring can be largely ascribed to foreign investment. However, small business accounted for 30-35% of GDP as early as 1994 and its share of the economy was on the increase (The Delegation of Hungary, 1996) . The growth in small business in these countries seems to have been an organic process, once economic deregulation had been conceded, as policy making has devoted little attention to the emergence of entrepreneurship despite the key role it was supposed to play in the economic transition. A natural question, therefore, is why Russia differs. 1 The definition of small firm is not, however, uniform across all the transition countries. Statistical bodies in Poland define a small firm as having fewer than six employees and a medium-scale firm as one with 6-50 employees, so the terms small and medium firms broadly correspond to the Russian definition of small firms. Poland's figure probably refers to small and medium-sized companies, as defined by Polish statistical bodies. 2 Gomulka is a well known economist who has also served as an advisor to the Polish Finance Ministry.
I have chosen to focus in particular on St. Petersburg because it seemed to be one of the most appropriate places where small business could progress in Russia. St. Petersburg represents the most European part of Russia with a highly-educated population. It is a leading industrial center with a high share of high-technology industries, most of which formerly belonged to the military industrial complex. Several international programs to promote entrepreneurship have been established in St. Petersburg. It is also one of the most liberal cities in Russia, having always returned pro-reform majorities since the first free elections in the early nineties. Even in Soviet times the city had a tradition of being strongly reformist and tried to follow its own path of development. Since the 1950s specific programs were devised by local authorities to foster innovation in industry. For these reasons it is reasonable to expect that economic reforms would take root more easily in St. Petersburg compared with the rest of the Russian Federation, and consequently create a favorable environment for the development of entrepreneurship.
Qualitative in-depth interviews were conducted in order to obtain a first-hand account of the business environment within which small businesses operate. The fieldwork was conducted in the period August 1997-October 1998. In total, more than 40 people were interviewed, of which seven were entrepreneurs and the rest were representatives of entrepreneurial associations, foreign firms, research institutes, the Academy of Science, foreign and Russian organisations promoting small business and also university professors and members of the local administration. Not all are reported in the study, but nevertheless most provided useful feedback. All entrepreneurs but one were involved in manufacturing. This was a deliberate choice because it is the development of manufacturing firms which plays the most important role for economic growth. The multiplier benefits of an expansion in the manufacturing sector are likely to be greater than those of a similar growth in service sector activity (Fothergill and Gudgin, 1982; Smallbone and other, 1997) . Dertouzoz, Lester and Solow (1989) argue that despite the obvious transformation of economic activity from manufacturing into services, manufacturing remains the cornerstone of a modern industrial economy.
Factors which have led to a slower development of small business in Russia compared to the leading transition countries: an analysis
Mainstream small business theory can be of only partial help given the particular conditions of the transition from a planned to a market economy. Entrepreneurs' personalities in Russia have been found to be quite similar to those in advanced market economies (Ageev, Gratchev and Hisrich, 1995; Kuznetsov McDonald and Kuznetsova, 2000) and the system of cultural values, which came into being in the last decade, is very sympathetic to entrepreneurship. Sociological studies have shown a rather positive attitude of the population towards private enterprises (Kuczi and Lengyei, 1995; Radaev, 1993; Blinov, 1998) . Shiller, Boyko and Korobov (1991) found Russians favorably inclined towards markets, in similar proportions to the populations of the United States, Germany and Japan. Research has shown that an abrupt shift in values has taken place since the beginning of perestroika. This has resulted in entrepreneurship being considered highly prestigious. The main reasons for the poor development in Russia put forward in this paper are the following:
• historical reasons which contributes to the lack of entrepreneurial culture
•
Olson's theory about the existence of strong interest groups which shares common ground with Baumol's theory on relative rewards for different types of economic activity.
The first explanation suggests that Russian entrepreneurs have less experience than their Eastern counterparts and therefore less developed business skills. This is because, unlike Russia, there was in the leading transition countries a strong entrepreneurial sector before the communist take-over, because communism lasted for slightly more than forty years instead of more than seventy and because domestic firms had more interrelations with Western counterparts. In addition, in two of these countries (Poland and Hungary) some entrepreneurial activity was allowed. The result is that key business skills are alien to Russian entrepreneurs and it will take a while before they are able to acquire these. Russian entrepreneurs may be highly qualified, but feel themselves lacking proper management and business knowledge ( Babaeva and Lapina, 1997) . For this reason, even if the new favorable attitudes to entrepreneurship have encouraged the creation of new firms, failure rates have been extremely high. Olson's (1982) contention that the existence of strong special interest groups in a country limits its ability to adopt new technologies and reallocate resources as a result of changing conditions is particularly relevant in Russia where the strong power of interest groups has led to the concession of extremely favorable conditions for well-connected individuals and has strongly influenced economic policy. This contrasts starkly with the leading transition countries, where the political leadership has been largely replaced, domestic policy has been less dominated by vested interests and "rules of the game" have been more clear and more fair.
As a result of this, the relative rewards for different types of economic activity have favored the allocation of entrepreneurship to largely unproductive activities, such as rent seeking and organized crime, rather than to productive activities.
The phenomena described above can, to a greater or lesser extent, be identified as having given rise to the following six conditions, which have had a much greater impact in Russia, than in the leading transition countries, and have acted as a constraint to small business development: , 1997) . This phenomenon was not so acute in the 1980s, when its incidence was lower than in some East European countries (Business Eastern Europe, 1996) . As the higher echelons of power have been guilty of one form of corruption or another in the eyes of the population and asset grabbing has been going on practically unchecked, the behavior of those in power has been replicated by lower levels of the bureaucratic structure. The poor salaries of state employees has also acted as a moral justification for their behavior.
2.
Income inequality has passed from being very moderate at the beginning of the decade to becoming one of the highest in the world while the variation has not been substantial in countries such Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (Milanovic, 1998 
3.
A complex yet deficient legislative framework is one of the features which has characterized the poorly performing transition countries in relation to the leading transition countries. In Russia the legal framework is characterized by an obstructive regulatory regime, high taxation and conflicting and convoluted legislation. Since taxation takes away about 80% of a company's profits the entrepreneur is left with no other option than carrying out a significant proportion of a firm's activities in the nonregulated sector. Opening and managing a business is more complicated and subject to greater bureaucratic interference than in Poland (Schleifer, 1997) . Comparisons with the Czech Republic and Hungary are likely to be equally unfavorable to Russia. In Russia a clear delimitation of power among the bodies which can enact legislation is lacking. The result is an array of conflicting rules, making it impossible for an entrepreneur to follow the law. The entrepreneur is, therefore, subject to the whims of the supervising bodies. As emphasized by some leading authorities 3 , favored groups might have had an interest in avoiding the implementation of a clear legal and tax framework, as their business dealings have been conducted on the fringe of the law and in order to prevent the emergence of new economic actors who could challenge their dominance, but no conclusive evidence can be provided on this point. It might also be argued that this is the result of the fact that historically there has been little respect for the rule of law in Russia. Whatever the reason, probably a combination of these two factors, after almost a decade, legislation seems to serve the purpose of discouraging business, rather than providing a framework in which it can prosper. The Russian tax system favors consumption over investment, being particularly punitive on manufacturing activities, and is therefore a serious impediment to growth.
Simplification of taxation had been on the agenda for many years, but it was only with the enactment of the first and the second part of the new tax code in 1999 and 2000 that it was partially achieved.
4.
Financing for small business has been extremely scarce. The banking sector is much smaller than in the leading transition countries and a very high proportion of domestic credit goes to the government and public enterprises (Russian Economic Trends, October 1997). Banks have been very cautious in financing small businesses, especially new start-ups which are considered too risky, given their high failure rate. Part of the blame lies with the state policy which encouraged the banks to invest in state bonds, instead of in the real sector. Then, the state-induced collapse of the banking system in 1998 led to a dramatic decrease in the amount of credit going to small businesses. State programs intended to develop small business have also remained largely unfulfilled, fueling doubts as to whether there is a real intention to promote it. Worse still, the limited resources allocated to the Federal Fund for Small Business Support were mostly mis-spent. In total about 90% of the resources received from the state were not utilized correctly (Sokolovskaia, 1998) . It can be concluded that the abolition of the State
Committee for the Support and Promotion of Entrepreneurship in late 1998 has, therefore, not been greatly regretted by the entrepreneurial class.
government only "an abstract idea and even dangerous. It is a threat to their existence" (Nelson and Kuzes, 1995) .
5.
Because of the larger output decline, industrial enterprises are in a worse condition in Russia than in the leading transition countries. Privatization has not led to a significant restructuring. One reason put forward is that privatization has not brought about a high degree of management turnover, e.g., as in the Czech Republic, thus leaving in place the old management regardless of their business skills. However, the state of industry can not only be attributed to poor skills of managerial staff. Industrial firms in Russia are penalized both by a punitive taxation system and high utility prices, as well as having to survive while receiving less than half of the revenues in non-cash form for most of the 1990s. The payment crisis which has arisen means that in 1997 an enterprise received on average less than 20% of its sale revenues in cash, rather than in non-monetary forms of payment. The rest was composed of veksels (promissory notes), . In some cases they are also bankrupted by the opportunistic behavior of the management who strip them of their assets for personal gain or intentionally cause bankruptcy in order to buy the firm cheaply. Adding to all this the depressed level of demand, it is, therefore, very hard for enterprises to prosper. In other East European countries the role of large enterprises has been instrumental in fostering the expansion of small enterprise networks; but in Russia the poor economic condition of most large enterprises has meant that a major sales outlet for small businesses is almost absent. While, for example, in Slovenia many small industrial firms were suppliers of large establishments (Bartlett and Prasnikar, 1995) , this option was scarcely available in Russia.
6. The payment of protection money is more widespread in Russia than in Poland or the Czech Republic (Shleifer, 1997), but the constraint that racketeering evidently places on business activity has not been ranked among the foremost of problems identified by entrepreneurs (Chepurenko, Avilova and Pripisnov, 1995; Radaev and others, 1995; Voprosy Statistiki, 1995; Leontief Center, 1998) . One reason for this may be a reluctance to discuss protection rackets, which makes any assessment of their effects difficult, but studies have generally considered the effects of racketeering a less pressing difficulty than those associated with complying with complex and contradictory legislation (Babaeva and Lapina, 1997; Zhuravskaya, 1998; Blinov, 1996) .
The absence of supporting networks is another reason which can be adduced for the slow growth of small businesses in Russia, although on this point we do not have enough evidence to confirm that the situation is worse than in the leading transition countries. The importance of networks is well documented in the economic literature (Brunner, 1993; Porter, 1990) . In Russia, given the economic turmoil and the underdevelopment of market institutions, networks are likely to play an even greater role, a fact which has been highlighted by several studies (Kuznetsov McDonald and Kuznetsova, 2000; Neace, 1999 formed by the former communist nomenklatura, which is the group largely reaping the benefits of transition, while for new entrepreneurs with few connections building a network of trusted partners will take time as trust usually evolves slowly. (Radaev, 1997) .
Statistical analysis of small business development
The difference of 15-25%, depending on the month referred to, is quite significant. In addition, the frequent changes in the methodology make it difficult to compare the data across the period. The small business share of total employment was only 13% in 1999 5 in Russia, compared to an SME share of two-thirds in the EU (OECD, 2000; Russian SME Resource 6 The definitions stated in the state program approved in 1995 are:
• the share of charter capital belonging to legal entities which are not small businesses, to state, religious, social and charitable organizations and other foundations must be lower than 25% (previously there was no limit concerning statutory capital).
• a maximum of 100 employees in industry, transport and construction (previously 200 by law), 60 in science, scientific services and agriculture (previously 100), 50 in wholesale trade, 30 in retail trade/public catering and consumer services (previously 15) and 50 in other spheres of activity (previously 50 for other sectors of In contrast to official statistics other sources give a much more positive picture of this sector. Babaeva and Lapina (1997) estimate the total number of small business employees at twenty million in 1995, that is to say one-third of the labor force, including those who are officially employed in state firms or unemployed, but who are really engaged in small business activity instead. According to data from a survey carried out in five Russian cities, the share of new private firms in total employment was 18.4% in 1998, or 20.6%, including secondary employment, which is mostly unregistered. Also adding self-employment it would be 22.5% (Clarke and Kabalina, 1999) . They found this share to have posted a continuous growth since 1987. What is puzzling is that growth became steadier after 1994 when officially the small business sector stopped growing. According to their data the majority of people employed by these new enterprises are employed by firms which fit the definition of small businesses. So, there are reasons to believe that that the small business contribution has not been fully captured in official statistics.
Although there are no official data on survival rates, small businesses in Russia seem to be characterized by an extremely short life-span (Holtmann, 1997; Polonsky, 1998) . Many firms were created in the enthusiasm of the new opportunities arising from the transformation of the economic system, but often lacked a clear market analysis and therefore could not survive long. The low output per firm -slightly more than $6,000 per year in 1997 (Russian SME Resource Centre, 1998) -testifies to the low development stage reached by most firms. Even taking into account the fact that Goskomstat does not capture the grey economy in its figuressurveys and experts' estimates suggest that this is around 30-40% in the small business sector (studies reported by IPSSA, 1998), the picture does not change substantially. A critical aspect of small business support is, therefore, not only to increase creation rates, but also to assist existing firms to survive and prosper. Conflicting survey results do not give a clear indication as to how small businesses are faring, but the prevalent picture has not been very favorable for industrial firms, while for trading firms the picture is mixed (OECD, 1997; Avilova and others, 1997; Vasil'chuk, 1997; Deikin, 1998) . However, the rouble devaluation of August 1998 has altered the picture in some industrial sectors. Output in small industrial enterprises increased by 61.8% in the course of 1999 as domestic producers have benefited from the steep production and 15 for other service sector activities).
price increase in foreign goods and from a change in the population's perception of domestic goods (Alimova and Ermilova, 2000) .
How small business is faring in St. Petersburg
The majority of the firms covered in the interviews (all industrial firms, but one) 7 remain in a very precarious financial position. They do not generate enough circulating capital to make any investment and have to utilise old and outdated equipment. Nor can they earmark enough financial resources to advertise their products, while often having to compete with foreign firms which can afford a much larger advertising budget. No figures were given as to profitability, but all complained that production is hardly profitable. However, Russian entrepreneurs might exaggerate their economic plight because they want to attract as little attention as possible. They tend to be very secretive when asked about these kinds of data.
From these interviews it seems that the better-performing firms are those selling directly to consumers or retail outlets, while those selling to industries or budget-financed institutions have great difficulties surviving. However, even for the former, the limited purchasing power of the population acts as a major stumbling block to their expansion. Among the entrepreneurs there is a palpable resentment towards Moscow, which in their opinion enjoys a much higher standard of living at the expense of the rest of Russia. A constant remark is that 70-80% of the financial resources of the country are concentrated in Moscow 8 .
The interviews carried out have highlighted how the success of a business is connected to a variety of factors which make the business environment unpredictable. One firm (BMN) is resigned to having lost a substantial amount of money because a major bank of St. Petersburg, 7 Interviews were carried out with: T. B., general director of Fitolon, a pharmaceutical company created in 1992. E. C., general director of Melp, a firm created in 1993 which produces medical equipment. S. H., general manager of Slavia, a publishing house, set up in October 1990. O.L., general director of Acvasviaz, a company set up in 1991 which develops and produces anti-theft devices and anti-fire equipment. M. M., general director of Gefest, a furniture producing firm created in 1988. T. P., director of BMN Peterburg, an advertising agency created in 1992. E. R., chief accountant of R. (the interviewee requested the name of the firm not be published), a firm set up in 1991 to develop and produce remote-controlled mechanical systems for x-ray and optical applications. 8 Confirmation of this can be found also in academic literature (Pimoshenko 1996: 54). one of its clients, on behalf of which it had anticipated the payment of advertising, found itself in financial difficulties and is unlikely to pay back the debt 9 , another firm (Acvasviaz) was almost bankrupted at the beginning of its activity because a state institution could not pay for what it had ordered, not having received the funds from the budget, the market niche targeted by a third company (Melp) disappeared in 1995-1996 after a few years of work because industrial clients no longer had the resources to spend on the ecological treatment of water and, according to the company's director, resorted to throwing water away without cleaning it, despite this being illegal. For this reason this firm turned to the production of medical equipment. The problem of the lack of compliance with the law also seriously affects Acvasviaz which has a potentially large market, as the installation of anti-fire equipment is compulsory. However, few firms can currently afford to abide by the law, since most Russian industries are in a very bad economic condition, and for this reason resort to bribing inspectors rather than complying with the regulations.
Because of the considerable swings in the level of market demand and the unpredictability of the environment firms tend to have a very flexible employment structure. Staff is usually reduced to a minimum, usually just administrative personnel, while industrial workers are employed only where there is an order. Alternatively, the work is contracted out to a larger factory where, usually, the problem is the converse: a surplus of workers. Other major problems encountered by these entrepreneurs are the continuous inspection by the tax and other departments, which can block a firm's activity; the freezing of a firm's bank account by tax bodies without warning; fraud, against which legislation offers little protection; a tax burden which makes non-compliance a necessity in order to survive; the onerous accounting procedures; the difficulties in obtaining outside financing; the lack of an effective patent law which can be enforced against imitators, the lack of domestic suppliers capable of meeting their requirements and in some cases the perceived inferiority of Russian products by the population. It seems that Russian consumers, who used to have a very low opinion of domestic products, now have a higher regard for domestic goods, which are not necessarily thought worse than foreign equivalents, according to a recent survey carried out by the Stockholm School of Economics in St. Petersburg (Shcherbakova, 1999: 9) . In sophisticated goods such as household appliances, a Russian brand can, however, still be an handicap, as also indicated in the same survey 10 . The penetration of foreign products reached its peak in 1995 when, according to official data, they accounted for 54% (Russian Economic Trends, 1999, no 
Economic policy in St. Petersburg
St. Petersburg has experienced the problems typical of defence-related cities. Few of the major military factories have been able to restructure and re-orient production and this has not been helped by the chaotic state policy towards conversion. The industrial sector in the city witnessed an output drop which was more marked than in Russia in general until 1996.
However, from 1997 the situation has been reversed, indicating that restructuring is taking place, at least in some sectors. A common feature of the years 1992-1996 is that regions producing more sophisticated outputs were in a more vulnerable position. The highest rates of decline were recorded in the central (including Moscow) and north-west regions (including St.
Petersburg), which are the most developed parts of Russia, while West and East Siberia, regions abundant in natural resources, have suffered much less from de-industrialization. New strategies for the future of the city had, therefore, to be devised in the 1990s as the city lost its importance as a defence center, raising fears of a progressive de-industrialization. In the early 1990s, the transformation of St. Petersburg into a free economic zone with favorable terms for foreign investors was expected to lead to an influx of foreign investment. It was hoped, that the city would revert to its pre-revolutionary role as a center of international business and finance.
However, this project, including the concession of tax and customs advantages, failed to bring the expected results, and the FEZ strategy was applied only to certain areas. Sobchak, mayor from 1991 to 1996, remained committed to the aim of making St. Petersburg an international center of business and finance, but the actual results have fallen far short of expectations.
10 The Stockholm School of Economics has a branch in St. Petersburg.
In view of the disappointing flow of foreign investment, the new mayor has paid much less attention to it, and has declared his main objective to be the restructuring of the industrial sector. A Strategic Plan has been devised to set the long-term strategy for the city economy.
However, the Plan seems to be a collection of differing interest-group recommendations without a clear structure and with no apparent strategy for the realization of its aims. A common feature of the post-transition years has been the countless plans devised by city officials. In the end, however, few of the measures indicated in these plans have been carried out. They can be considered more declarations of intent than practical policies. A command economy mentality still seems to be prevalent among economic policy makers, but this is also the consequence of the disastrous situation in which industry finds itself: this situation acts as Petersburg has also retained a significant role in promoting co-operation with other members of the Federation, signing agreements to exchange locally-made products for the produce of other regions in order to assure the city an adequate food supply as market signals are still not working properly.
Favoritism has been rife. Despite St. Petersburg being considered a liberal city, mayors have behaved like dictators, trying to subdue the legislative assembly and dispensing favors to their "cronies". Entrepreneurs with the right connections have been able to secure more advantageous conditions in the forms of: premises at knocked-down prices, either on rent or through privatization; city orders; tax deferments; and exemption from inspection. The new mayor, Yakovlev, elected in 1996 promised to put finances in order and cut down on favoritism. In effect, fiscal management has made huge steps forward. The dramatic situation in which the city administration found itself in the early nineties, when the decline in budget revenues due to the severe economic crisis was accompanied by a widening of the responsibilities that the city had to take on, was finally overcome in the late nineties with a balancing of expenditures and revenues. Even if past deficits have left a large debt, St.
Petersburg was one of the few Russian cities not to default on the repayments of the loans granted by foreign bodies. Success in fiscal management has, however, not meant that old methods have been eradicated. Municipal tenders are still assigned without proper competition and the strong influence of shadowy figures in local government prompted the architect of financial stabilization to resign in 1999.
Small business growth in St. Petersburg
Despite the economic problems and the fact that the "rules of the game" have not been equal for all, St. Petersburg has, nevertheless, experienced a very large growth (by Russian standards) of the small business sector since 1992. Even though its level remains lower than in Moscow, the growth in the 1990s has been the largest in Russia. Small business development in Russia has been primarily centered in these two cities, where the economic resources to sustain small business activity are mainly concentrated. The share of small business in total employment in St. Petersburg was 30.4% in 1999 (taking into account permanent full-time workers and contract workers). As a comparison, in Moscow the analogous percentage was 34.8% (Goskomstat, 2000) . The much lower unemployment rate in St. Petersburg compared with Russia as a whole can be in part attributed to the high level of development achieved by this sector in the city. Official unemployment was 1.2% in March 1998. This is 2.3 times lower than the analogous figure for the whole of Russia 12 (The Socio-Economic Situation in St. Petersburg. A General Overview, 1998, no. 32 ).
The engine of this growth has been retail trade and public catering firms, which had only a minor role at the start of the decade. This is in contrast to that of scientific firms, the role of which in the small business sector has progressively waned. In St. Petersburg, the number of small businesses grew by more than 11 times between 1992 and 1999, while in Russia the increase was a mere 60% and threefold if we consider also the previous year (1991). However, data for 1992 are probably underestimated. In 1992 St. Petersburg accounted for just 1.7% of all small enterprises in Russia with 3.3% of the Russian population, while in 1999 the corresponding share was 12%. Such a low level in 1992 is clearly absurd as small business is bound to be more developed in big cities and there is no objective reason why small business should lag so far behind in St. Petersburg in 1992. What is especially puzzling is the extremely low number of retail trade and public catering firms, considering the fact that in 1990 retail trade per capita was almost 30% higher then in the country as a whole (Goskomstat, 1999) .
Their concentration in relation to the population was one-fifth of the Russian average in 1992, but by 1999 it was four times bigger. Different privatization policies cannot explain this as small privatized firms represent a negligible percentage of the whole number of firms. The total number of firms privatized in the city amounted to 3,962 between 1992 and 1996.
This growth has taken place in the absence of a clear policy by the local government to promote small business. In Russia, the attitude towards small business has varied greatly between different local administrations. These administrations have a strong influence on the business environment: a substantial share of the tax burden is determined by local bodies, as well as the rent of premises, the majority of which they own. They also have considerable autonomy in implementing regulations. In general, the entrepreneurs interviewed in St.
Petersburg Predprinimatel' Peterburga, 1999, no.13; Shabalina, 1999) . Small businesses in St. steps have the creation of a single licence chamber, the lowering of the profits tax and the removal of the tax on educational institutions. However, these tax measures alone have had unemployment was in reality 9.8% in the city by the end of 1996 (City of Saint Petersburg 1996 . In addition, many workers, although employed, are not paid.
little effect, as the tax burden remains extremely high. The taxes on total revenues are especially crippling.
In addition to the lack of support from the administration, St. Petersburg, unlike Moscow, does not enjoy a particularly high standard of living, which is only slightly higher than the national average. In 1998 the average income in St. Petersburg was 9% higher than in Russia as a whole, while in Moscow it was four times as much (Goskomstat, 1999 • The high educational level of the population -the highest in Russia (Lesage and Bayou, 1993 ) -and their more "Western mentality" because of their proximity with advanced market economy, which makes them more prone to engage in entrepreneurial activity.
• The presence of a small, but relevant, by Russian standards, middle class. The population is characterized by a higher than in Russia proportion of pensioners with very low incomes, which means that there is a sizable share of the population with higher than average incomes, who have money to spend on non-essential goods.
• Spending in the city economy is boosted by the presence of a sizable foreign communityabout 12-15,000 people (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999) -and a steady influx of tourists, as well as inhabitants of the surrounding region (Leningrad Oblast) who work in the city.
This explains why retail spending per capita is higher then in Russia as a whole and why small business growth has been mainly concentrated in services. Retail trade per capita was 13% to 50% higher than the average in Russia between (Goskomstat, 2000 , However, the switch of consumers' preference to domestic goods in some sectors, after their initial curiosity for foreign products, helped by the fact that domestic products are improving their look, bodes well for industrial entrepreneurs. This tendency has been accelerated by the rouble devaluation.
Conclusion
When analyzing small business in Russia two factors have to be taken into consideration:
• the limitations of the definition of small business • the question mark over the reliability of the official statistics.
Official figures are not wholly comparable with those of other European countries because of the different criteria utilised to define small business and therefore tend to belittle small business contribution in Russia. Officially small business in Russia has stagnated after a few years of swift development in the early 1990s, remaining at a level which is well below that in developed market economies and also in the leading transition countries. Small business in Russia has expanded considerably only in Moscow and St. Petersburg. However, data on the total number of enterprises suggest a marked dynamism even in the second half of the nineties.
The strong increase of this figure is officially due to the fact that many firms which cease activity are not liquidated and therefore are kept in the state register, while others never become operational. However, the evidence of the survey conducted by Clarke and Kabalina seems to suggest that small business growth has been under-estimated. In addition, numerous factors (the presence of a relatively large middle class -by Russian standards -a comparatively large foreign community and the tourist industry) make retail spending per capita in St. Petersburg higher than in Russia as a whole. Goskomstat, 1998: 342; Statisticheskoe Obozrenie, 1999, no. 3: 19; Goskomstat, 1996: 226; Goskomstat, 1999: 274, 281; Alimova and Ermilova, 2000 . 
